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

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RELATIONS OF CKW/CHI WITH OTHER GERMAN CRYPTOLOGIC BUREAUX

1. During his period of detention (September - December 1946) at the Hq 7707 European Command Intelligence Center, Oberursel, Germany, Wilhelm FENNER, former Ministerialrat and chief of cryptanalysis in the Armed Forces High Command Cryptologic Agency (CKW/Chi), wrote a lengthy report concerning his past career and extensive experiences in the field of cryptology. This report was never issued in translation although an inadequate summary by Army Security Agency was issued as TICOM/I-206.

2. It is presently planned to issue a complete translation of the entire report in the DF series (DF-187). The attached translation is the fourth of the series and is FENNER's description of the relations of CKW/Chi with other German cryptologic bureaux.

3. Previous TICOM reports in this series are:

DF 187 The Career of Wilhelm FENNER with Special Regard to His Activity in the Field of Cryptography and Cryptanalysis

DF 187A Organization of the Cryptologic Agency of the Armed Forces High Command, with Names, Activities, and Number of Employees together with a Description of the Devices Used

DF 187B The Cryptanalytic Successes of CKW/Chi after 1938

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RELATIONS OF OKW/CHI WITH OTHER GERMAN CRYPTOLOGIC BUREAUX

A. Relations with OKM 4 SKL III[1]

The relations of OKW/Chi with this unit, known at Chi as "Marine" ["Navy"], were the oldest. That resulted from the fact that the Navy had carried on cryptanalytic work even during World War I, that the unit had its quarters in the former Navy office in Berlin on the Landwehrkanal, and that the workers of the "Navy" were so to speak comrades of the other faculty. Nevertheless the collaboration was very loose. This was due to the fact that the "M" (used hereafter as abbreviation for the official designation OKM 4 SKL III) worked with very few exceptions only on foreign naval messages. The exception was the work on those English Government plain codes which were used by the world empire in traffic with its colonies. The consequences of this limitation to purely naval affairs was that all those things which might have led to the so dreaded inter-service frictions where there were like assignments were wanting and neither party could have disputed the other's claim to success without having to keep its own success secret. So when Chi began early in the 20's preparing cryptanalytic reports (at first monthly, later quarterly down to but not including 1933), it was natural that "M" also received a copy of these reports. "M" did likewise. A study of the reports showed, however, that they could be of no mutual assistance: the traffic worked on was too different. So the reports continued to be exchanged; otherwise the cooperation was limited to paying a personal call on the expert of the other faculty whenever there seemed something worth showing him and then talking things over. There might be no such discussions for months at a time and yet each one was confident that he could at any time turn to a fellow worker of the other faculty if he thought it would be worth while. The delimitation of assignments also had the result that Chi automatically turned over to "M" forthwith any messages of foreign navies which had erroneously been intercepted by its intercept stations while "M" did

1. Oberkommando der Marine 4 Seekriegsleitung (designation for the Navy High Command Cryptologic Bureau).

the same with diplomatic messages. When late in 1944 the Commission for Cipher Devices was set up with Government Councillor (Regierungsrat) Dr. HUETTENHAIN as chairman, "M" was naturally also represented. Whenever there was a change of director in Chi or "M" the old and new directors or chiefs paid a farewell call and an initial call but there was no regular contact between these persons. I met as Director of "M": Kapitaenleutnant KISERITZKY (shortly after World War I), then Kapitaenleutnant MOESSEL, and shortly before the outbreak of the war a Kapitaen R..., whose name I do not recall but do remember that he had once thrown himself over an exploding hand grenade in order to prevent disaster and bore marks of severe wounds. Of the people who occasionally came to call on my associates and were visited by me or my associates the following are known to me: Superior Government Councillor (Oberregierungsrat) TRANOW and Superior Government Councillor (Oberregierungsrat) FRANKE. The latter became liaison official of "M" with Chi shortly before the collapse and at the end was interpreter with an American staff in Werfen.

B. Relations with OKL Chistelle[2]

When at GOERING's order and at the instigation of General MARTINI the Air Force set about organizing a cryptanalytic section of its own, there were still some interpreters of the Air Force in training with Chi. On the basis of my experience, I had intended to continue this training for about two years but I was forced to give up this personnel at once. Without being able to fix the date I think it was in 1937. So the Air Force cryptanalytic section began its work with the meager knowledge and experience obtained at Chi. As far as became known to me, work was done primarily on such Soviet Russian radio traffic as could be regarded both as Army radiogram and as Air Force radiogram. Since, in the course of the work, unforeseen difficulties kept cropping up, one of the [illegible]telle) von LINGEN, later Specialist Leader (Sonderfuehrer) frequently came to Chi to get advice. From this there developed an attachment which continued in the future. As often as the Air Force

2. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Chiffrierstelle (designation for the Air Force High Command, Cryptologic Bureau).

cryptanalytic section was in need of help, von LINGEN came, but in the same way Chi could always call up LINGEN if it wanted to know whether he had made any progress or when Chi needed material which it assumed the Air Force cryptanalytic section must have. Although, strictly speaking, the work at Chi and at the Air Force ran parallel, there never arose any conflicts as to competence; on the contrary, in case of need there was open collaboration for the purpose of helping to obtain reliable intelligence results as quickly as possible. Who the directors of the Air Force cryptanalytic unit were I cannot tell today. Known to me were the workers von LINGEN, Major KUPFFER (formerly employed at Chi). I met a number of other members of the Air Force cryptanalytic unit but their names have escaped me, all the more since I had direct contact personally only with von LINGEN.

C. Relations with OKH/In 7/VI[3]

The setting up of a separate Army cryptanalytic section against my will and against the will of General FELLGIEBEL by desire of General von BRAUCHITSCH was under an unlucky star. Adequately trained personnel could be found only at Chi but this personnel was not numerically adequate to set up a modern cryptanalytic section. The order to do so was given in 1938, if I recall aright, and led to a division of Chi. Since a cryptanalytic unit cannot exist by itself alone but requires an extensive intercept organization, my staff of cryptanalysts was almost unaffected by loss of personnel. Other parts of Chi had to turn over a good many persons. In particular some intercept stations which had hitherto worked for Chi were now attached organizationally to OKH. I assume today that In 7, which had long entertained the idea of giving the Army a cryptanalytic section of its own, had prepared the necessary cryptanalytic personnel without [illegible] began practical operation with the assistance of some cryptanalytic assitants from the intercept stations. The first director of the Army High Command Cryptologic Bureau (OKH-Chiffrierstelle)

3. Oberkommando des Heeres, Inspektion 7/VI (designation for the Army High Command Cryptologic Bureau).

was Captain von KORNATZKY (captured by the Russians at Stalingrad), who came from Chi. The attempt made repeatedly by Chi to establish a working contact with the people in the Army cryptanalytic section had no success. This may have been due to the first director of the Army cryptanalytic unit, Captain MANG, or he may have had instructions to this effect from his superior, Lieutenant Colonel HASSEL, - I never did learn the true reasons for such an attitude - at least no sensible rational collaboration resulted. Instead Chi was forbidden to continue deciphering systems of foreign armies. I have already mentioned elsewhere that this activity was nevertheless continued under me because to my mind the Army cryptanalytic section could not successfully handle certain problems alone. When Captain Dr. JUNG became director of Army cryptanalysis at the Army cryptologic bureau (Heereschiffrierstelle) the tension was eased and while Major Baron OSTEN-SACKEN headed this unit[4] during the war I even made available the Soviet Army systems solved by my associates, allowed my people to be detailed to OKH and allowed them to extend every conceivable aid. OSTEN-SACKEN put a bullet through his head after 20 July 1944 because he was under suspicion of having been involved in the events of that day. When the detail of my people expired (autumn 1942),[5] the contact was also broken off, without any personal feelings to be sure. The successor of Lieutenant Colonel Baron OSTEN-SACKEN was Lieutenant Colonel ANDRAE who, shortly before the outbreak of the war, was transferred from the cryptologic section for service at the front. Another member of Chi OKH was Government Councillor (Regierungsrat) Baron ENGELHARDT who had originally been an employee of the Cryptologic Bureau of the Ministry of War (Chi RKM), also the official BLOCK who had likewise belonged earlier to the Cryptologic Bureau of the Ministry of War. The names of other members of this unit are no longer familiar to me.

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4. It had changed its name several times.

5. Autumn 1944? (Editor's note).

D. Relations with the Foreign Office (Auswaertige Amt)

The cryptanalytic bureau of the Foreign Office developed out of the cryptanalytic service of Grand Headquarters of World War I. The director of the Cryptologic Bureau of the Foreign Office, later Ambassador of the First Rank (Gesandter Erster Klasse) SELCHOW, had been discharged as captain in the signal troops and had been taken over by the Foreign Office. The relations of Chi with the Foreign Office were strained during the first half of the twenties in spite of outwardly correct behavior. I have already stated elsewhere that the Foreign Office took the point of view that the Armed Forces should not concern themselves with the cryptographic system of foreign governments. This was a plain challenge on the part of the Foreign Office and with any such attitude any common work on the systems of foreign governments was naturally out of the question. Of course, Chi saw through the negative attitude of the then Government Councillor (Regierungsrat) SELCHOW: in order to preserve the bureaucratic point of view so anxiously maintained in official life and in order a priori to make any attack upon him impossible, SELCHOW was operating with the thesis that the Armed Forces were interfering in the field of the Foreign Office. SELCHOW may have been clever enough to realize that the opinion he expressed was merely a signboard; in reality he declined to cooperate because he was afraid he would have to give Chi more than he would get from it. This standpoint was comprehensible enough but was objectively false because at that time Chi was already reading English, American, Italian, and French state telegrams and could have been of real use, all the more so since Chi was constantly improving its intercept work. However, Chi made no use of the fact that the true reason for SELCHOW's adverse answer was known and instead put up other arguments which secured a very strong position for Chi and were of decisive importance whenever the question of the basic claim of the Armed Forces to the cryptanalysis of foreign government systems was raised in military circles:

1. If Chi is reproached with having exceeded its competence when it decrypts foreign diplomatic messages, then the Armed Forces requests the Foreign Office to make available to it all deciphered diplomatic messages in which military matters are touched upon.

2. If the Foreign Office should refuse this request, then the point could be discussed, if necessary, whether the Foreign Office would be ready to pass on at least the contents of such messages. In this connection it must not be forgotten that the soldier and the diplomat, due to their fields of work, the assignments set for them, and the responsibility which each of them must bear, will evaluate and utilize the content of a message very differently in many cases. (This actually correct assertion served as a basis for characterizing as inadequate a possible offer of the Foreign Office to give Chi the content of telegrams).

3. If one demands of Chi, - and that is the sole justification for its existence, - that in case of a future war it shall successfully work on the cryptographic systems of foreign Armed Forces, then it is foolish to demand that Chi shall be allowed to work only on the relatively primitive Army systems of the present time in preparation for such a task, the complexity of which no human being can foretell. It would be impossible to foresee whether in the future in the traffic of the higher staffs cryptographic systems might not appear which in their structure belong to the type of the diplomatic systems. Therefore merely for training purposes Chi could not be content with working solely on the systems of foreign armies.

Chi was perfectly well aware that none of these arguments would be strong enough to induce the Foreign Office to collaborate. The arguments were intended rather as a defense in case the Foreign Office should undertake official steps to take diplomatic cryptanalysis away from Chi. In the discussion which might then be expected Chi would have advanced a further argument:

4. There are basic reasons [illegible] to concern himself with cryptanalysis: his position before the international public makes it essential that he avoid every ticklish source of information; a knowledge of the contents of decrypted foreign cryptograms is much more likely to bring the diplomat under suspicion of having relations with a "Black Chamber" than it is the soldier, whose broad back can sustain a

heavier load and who can, in case of need, attribute his acquaintance with the secrets of foreign countries to his good intelligence service. To back up this sound view the case of Hungary was cited where cryptanalytic work was exclusively in the hands of military persons.

It did not come to an open conflict, however, between the Wilhelmstrasse and Chi. For Chi had meanwhile improved its reception and was already intercepting thousands of diplomatic radiograms which were offered to the Foreign Office. SELCHOW perceived the advantage of such a connection with Chi because his cryptanalytic section could only rely on the material which the main telegraph office placed at its disposition. Consequently the increased opportunities afforded by the intercepts from Chi were definitely worth considering. So SELCHOW accepted the offer and from this moment on there was no longer any fear of measures being taken by the Foreign Office which would be prejudicial to the work of Chi. Somewhat later SELCHOW was informed, without any suggestion that he treat the matter confidentially, that Chi was reading the Polish diplomatic systems. Then he changed his tactics and himself sought a connection, even though he did this merely on the pretext of desiring common orientation. The form chosen by SELCHOW was not essential to Chi: once SELCHOW permitted the experts here and there to talk over and solve problems, it was natural that such discussion would lead to lasting collaboration as soon as there was no question about mutual advantage. And since Chi always had a livelier working tempo and had been very fortunate in the selection of its cryptanalysts, Chi was sometimes able to offer far more than it received from the Foreign Office. In this connection it was the principle of the cryptanalytic unit, which I represented, not to indulge in keeping a petty account showing what each party contributed but rather to keep in view the interests of the whole: mutual unreserved furtherance of the work in order to [redacted] be adequate for the demands of the times and able to divide up different fields if occasion required, to exchange personnel, and to adapt itself to the conditions as they arose. In the period which followed this spirit characterized the relation between Chi and the Foreign Office: personal differences which arose could not affect the very close collaboration. Traffic which was requested was exchanged

without reserve, likewise code groups and reencipherments; every special discovery was brought to the attention of the other units; in order to expedite the work, the handling of Turkish messages, for instance, was in the quarters of the Foreign Office and the appropriate personnel from Chi were detailed there while the Foreign Office turned over some employees to Chi. And when, due to successful air attacks on Berlin, Chi could no longer house its personnel in its own rooms and my own office had gone up in flames, the Foreign Office provided speedy aid. An agreement was reached with the Foreign Office to maintain this connection without fail in case of an evacuation of Berlin, even a combining of the two organizations in a common emergency shelter was planned for and only the technical impossibility of carrying out such a plan in April 1945, because the alternative quarters (Halle/Salle) were already overfilled, separated the fate of the cryptanalytic sections of the Foreign Office and of Chi.

Known to me from the cryptologic bureau of the Foreign Office were:

SELCHOW, Gesandter I. Klasse, Hauptmann, a.D.

PASCHKE, Adolf, Oberregierungsrat, general cryptanalysis, Russia, Italy.

Dr. SCHAUFFLER, Oberregierungsrat, analyst.

Dr. KUNZE, Regierungsrat (?), analyst.

ZASTROW, Angestellter, England, America.

Dr. (?) LANGLOTZ, Regierungsrat (?), own systems, supposedly dead.

Dr. KRUG, Analyst, belonged to the war personnel, astronomer in civilian life.

CASPER, KASPER (?), Angestellter (?), Roumania.

II Relations with the Forschungsamt des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums[6]

At the time of the founding of the Forschungsamt (FA) which as an agency of the Prussian Prime Minister Hermann GOERING was a state and not a national agency, the actual leaders of this organization were the former Kapitaen-leutnant SCHIMPF and the former employee of the Cryptologic Bureau Captain (retired) (Hauptmann a.D.) SCHAPPER. Both were well aware of the former tension between the Foreign Office and Chi; therefore both of them knew how dangerous it is for the welfare of an agency if it can be proven that it has exceeded its authority. In such cases any narrow point of view became a well established legal claim to defense against those who, so to speak, were taking away one's daily bread! In the spring of 1933 Chi had seen the above-mentioned officers and employees transferred to the FA, not without regret. Professional doubts were immediately raised when word got around that the FA intended to set up a cryptanalytic unit. Personal friction could not fail to develop when the FA through the former members of Chi, SCHIMPF and SCHAPPER, declared that Chi was not competent to work on foreign diplomatic messages because HITLER had selected the FA alone for this work. It was quite natural that the cryptanalysts of Chi, who aside from myself were all employees, regarded with concern the possibility of a dissolution of the unit. There was a repetition of what had happened years before when the Foreign Office tried to deny to Chi the right to decipher foreign diplomatic messages whereby the FA likewise made the same mistake and would not obligate itself to make known to the Ministry of Defense at least the content of messages deciphered in the FA. The FA also overestimated its plenipotentiary powers in another respect. Actually, in spite of the weighty influence of Hermann GOERING, these were slight: how could an agency of a state, Prussia, presume to lay down the law to the Ministry of Defense? And if HITLER as an imperfectly oriented Chancellor did give the FA alone the order to cryptanalyze, it does not follow at all that he has any right to take away from the Ministry of Defense (Chi) the right to cryptanalyze since the Chancellor cannot give such

6. Research Bureau of the German Air Ministry (designation of the signal intelligence agency founded by GOERING).

orders to a unit of the Ministry of Defense! In the Ministry of Defense we had absolutely no idea of submitting to the ill-founded wishes of the FA, all the more so since the Foreign Office felt little desire to replace its time-tested partner, Chi, with the extremely dubious partner, FA. It was also quite conceivable that the FA would have demanded the dissolution of the Cryptologic Bureau of the Foreign Office if Chi had complied with the demands of the FA for the cessation of its cryptanalytic work. As yet the FA had no radio intercept service of its own, consequently the Foreign Office remained dependent on Chi for radio traffic. To take the cryptanalytic work away from Chi but to suffer it to intercept foreign diplomatic radiograms was a contradiction per se! There was a lot of talking and threatening, but the only concession that was made to the FA was the release by Chi of those people who expressed the free wish to leave Chi and go to the FA. FELLGIEBEL and I had agreed on this so as not to have people in our own unit who were trying as hard as they could to go to GOERING. Thus the FA was forced to organize and to carry on its cryptanalytic work with far less trained personnel than it had assumed. Development proceeded but slowly, therefore, in spite of all that GOERING did to promote it, in spite of large sums of money, and in spite of the hiring of many people - when I employed 40 persons in the cryptanalytic section the FA had engaged 60 in a like section. This did not run counter to the wishes of Chi because during these months SELCHOW thought it tactically correct to be reticent in respect to Chi and to cooperate loyally with the FA. How close this contact between FA and the Foreign Office was I never knew. I was only interested in the ostensible successes of the FA which supposedly received from the Foreign Office all that it needed in the way of spiritual equipment, - all of which, however, did not prevent the Foreign Office (SELCHOW) from inquiring confidentially from time to time as to the state of the cryptanalytic work at Chi and from sending his associates to me to copy French code groups, the solution of a Serbian system, and Roumanian reencipherments. From such visits, which were rare at first but later became more frequent, deductions could be made as to the accomplishment of the FA. However, there was no dearth of attempts on the part of the FA to reestablish contact with the cryptanalytic section of

Chi, with a more or less tacit acceptance of the incompetence of Chi. The project failed due to the prerequisite for any such community efforts: the FA had asserted itself as an additional link in the procurement of cablegrams and taken over the duty hitherto performed by the main telegraph office directly, namely supplying the Foreign Office and Chi with copies of cablegrams. Thus the channel had not merely become longer but the FA also exercised a censorship inasmuch as it was proven that FA claimed not to have received certain cablegrams whereas the Foreign Office had received them from FA. In the second place, the personal attitude of some people in the FA toward me had resulted in such obvious efforts to have me relieved of my office (unfounded accusation of Jewish ancestry, later an unfounded accusation of having spoken libelously of BLOMBERG and GOERING, tapping my telephone in the Ministry of Defense, maintaining an agent, (a spy) in my own office), so that I should not have been able to decide to cooperate unless the FA had made amends for all the injustice done me. Since this did not happen, everything remained as it was: the FA gave its cablegrams and radiograms, Chi turned over its radio traffic; but there was no exchange of code groups or reencipherments, and even though there were no more open conflicts, nevertheless the FA still remained an agency hostile to the Armed Forces, a situation which did not change when its founders left Prussian service and became officials of the Armed Forces in the Air Force, i. e., Military persons. The bad reputation of the Forschungsamt as a private organization for which there was no logical need and which merely served the vanity and ambition of Hermann GOERING, an organization headed by people who can set more store by their personal advantage than by the patriotism they were always talking about, not only remained bad in military circles for 12 years but when, after the 20th of July 1944, the final attempt was made to coordinate the [illegible] unproductive duplication in the field of cryptanalysis and I was given the commission of making preliminary studies looking toward the creation of a national cryptanalytic agency, even the SS-General (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer) SCHELLENBERG[7] was of the opinion that the FA must vanish without a trace because

7. After 20.7.44 became Chief of Counterintelligence (Abwehrchef) within the framework of the Militaerisches Amt.

it had become nothing more than the "private plaything of Herman GOERING" to quote SCHELLENBERG's own words.

F. Additional Remarks on the Forschungsamt

In spite of the dislike of Chi and the Foreign Office for the Forschungsamt it is possible that this organization had good success in many, possibly in very many, fields of cryptanalytic work. Thus the entire Slavic Section is supposed to have rated very high. I myself could never get this impression since otherwise the Foreign Office would not have found it necessary to turn over to the FA a Yugoslav system contrary to the agreement made with Chi. I rather had the impression that the great personal successes of SEIFERT, SCHAPPER, SCHROEDER, etc., had rendered these people spiritually unfruitful. Naturally the FA was also represented in the Commission for Testing Devices (Chairman: Regierungsrat Dr. HUETTENHAIN of my unit), but the representative of the FA turned out to be an absolute layman who lacked even the most elementary concepts of a modern cryptographic device! If that was the expert of the much touted Forschungsamt, then nothing could be expected of its less expert members. I have often had in my hand the results of decryption at the FA: their value was problematic! For, corresponding to the dense mantle of mystery in which the FA enveloped itself from the beginning, the decrypted messages were so secret that they were never put out in the form of a sensible translation but were given only as summaries. This was in direct opposition to the policy of the Foreign Office and Chi which was to translate as conscientiously as possible since to the Foreign Office a decrypted message was a "document", and to Chi it was a "report". The decrypted messages of the FA were neither the one thing nor the other but a piece of information of questionable objectivity. The consequence of this was that inexactitudes appeared which occasionally caused even HITLER to inquire of the competent Cryptologic Bureau what the correct translation was!

I got the impression that, despite the favor it enjoyed in a material way and in spite of really competent workers, the FA was lacking in sober objectivity: the empire building mania of the chief had affected his associates and those less affected did not realize they were making themselves ridiculous. I know the FA was sometimes reproached for upsetting the work of the German counter-intelligence service. I have no reason to assume that this assertion was not

correct. For it was the fate of the FA to meddle with some service or other which was already in existence and which then had to be abolished if possible and turned over to the FA - so that it might have a reason for existing! Thus in the history of National Socialism the FA will merely play the role of the mischievous, spoiled child which is caressed by its father and partly feared, partly ridiculed and despised by its comrades and merely owes its existence to a foolish father. Or, speaking seriously, the FA is a phenomenon of degeneration: a statesman needs confidential reports for his information; to get these he does not make use of the already existing organizations, does not take the time to test their ability to produce what he wants, but rejects them unseen in order to set up for himself alone, as the center of all his actions, an intelligence apparatus which in its extent might have satisfied the needs of a great power; he likes to term himself the "ranking officer" of the German Armed Forces but with his pet organization he upsets the circles of the Armed Forces; not knowing what to do himself, he allows himself to be advised by people of weak character and finds satisfaction in a bureaucratic monstrosity, as if in this way he were justified and got revenge for some earlier personal slight; there is no thinking for himself, no honest criticism, no sense of reality, because he concentrates solely on material things, specifically comfort and luxury; there is no knowledge of himself, - and that is the sickly thing about it all, - the gigantic apparatus gives the appearance of an all embracing spirit and the lord of thousands of secrets believes he has found the philosopher's stone. The FA was supposed to be a sort of spiritual Aladdin's Lamp (Tischlein-deck-Dich), ever ready when some wise information is needed in order to make no political mistakes; a kind of dead sure rule for always winning at the political Roulette wheel. If such a concept of the art of governing had the more nature, then the measures of the FA to reach this goal were already painful, for there is nothing so obnoxious as coquettish ugliness and self-satisfied spiritual insignificance. Thus I never heard that the FA completed any performance calling for mental effort. At the beginning of its activity the members received money presents from GOERING whenever a primitive cryptographic system had been solved. That had a ridiculous effect.

In the offices of the FA were to be found all the latest technical devices, worthy of an enterprise aiming at substantial and productive work. These office wonders they liked to show to friendly persons without any realization of the fact that reveling in such office luxury and boasting about the thick carpets had nothing to do with the matter in hand nor with people who claimed to love their country more than other ordinary mortals. There was a clever system of guards and controls, duly recorded oaths of secrecy, clock time stamps, and motorized messengers, all of them things to which there is no objection if they have any sense and purpose. But there everyone to whom the mysteries of the FA were shown got the impression that there was no content to go with the technical form. That sterling quality which would have given the Prussian Prime Minister a moral right to organize such a huge intelligence service was wanting, since one was no longer obligated to be rather than to seem to be, instead one projected himself into this illusory world and considered it to be one's own precious reality.

G. Persons Who Transferred from Chi to the Forschungsamt

Those persons who went from Chi to the Forschungsamt (FA) were:

1. Lt Captain (Kapitaenleutnant) SCHIMPF
2. Emil Baron (Freiherr) von REZNICEK, Employee (Angestellter)
3. Captain (Hauptmann) Walter SELFERT
4. Carl WAECHTER, Employee
5. Studienassessor Martin PAETZEL, Employee
6. Alois (?) WENZEL, Employee
7. Friedrich (?) SCHAPFER, Employee
8. Max BOETTGER, Employee
9. Fraeulein GLAESER, Employee

SCHIMPF was an officer on active duty and deputy of the then Director of Chi, Hauptmann (Captain) OSCHMANN, who fell in the West as Major General (Generalleutnant).

Von REZNICEK was analyst for Italy in my unit.

SEIFERT was the immediate superior of SCHAPPER and directed the intercept service, evaluation, and thus the procurement of telegrams including all pertinent questions of the service insofar as cryptanalysis was not concerned.

WAECHTER was decipherer for English but also helped with analytic problems, in my unit.

PAETZEL was decipherer for French in my unit.

WENZEL was decipherer for Polish in my unit.

SCHAPPER was head of a small section[8] which was to work on improvement of our own reception, e. g., selection of suitable sites for the erection of new intercept stations, procurement of building plans, apparatus, and equipment. He had been active after the First World War had been lost as Captain, Ord., in the cipher section as a not highly paid employee, he was surely very zealous and probably quite capable so that the role of a minor employee undoubtedly did not suit him. Thus it may have happened that in his memory he had become "Chef" and at least felt better with that recollection.

BOETTGER was decipherer for French and, as far as I know, was soon passed on by the Forschungsamt to RIBBENTROP's Bureau. In my unit.

GLAESER was statistical clerk and assistant to WAECHTER. In my unit.

SCHROEDER developed own cryptographic systems when necessary, made analytic studies, e. g., of the Army Enigma, and helped anywhere in the analytic section where an industrious man who knew no languages was needed. In my unit.

H. Remarks on the Supposed "Incompetence" of Chi

The many political crises in Germany and the sometimes strongly emphasized national factor in HITLER's speeches had naturally made a lasting impression on many civilians in the Ministry of Defense. Comrades of like mind banded together - often good patriots - and formed small circles of people who no longer found the

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8. When asked whether SCHAPPER was "Chef" of a section, FETHER replied:

"Friedrich SCHAPPER was never "Chef" of a section. I have stated elsewhere that to have a "Chef" there must be an "Abteilung". Now at that time the entire cipher section was still a "Group", i. e., at its head stood not a "Chef" but only a "Leiter". So when the entire outfit was not even an "Abteilung", a part of it could certainly not be an "Abteilung". Hence SCHAPPER was not Chef."

fruitless speeches in the Reichstag significant, who also regarded HUGENBERG's[9] German national policy as too irresolute and unpromising, and regarded HITLER as the true savior of Germany. In Chi, too, such a circle was formed. At first these people remained good comrades; they thought and felt patriotically and did their duty no less well than other people. Late in 1932 these people became more radical. At first cautiously, then more openly, they abandoned their reserve, talked politics even during working hours, took up collections during working hours for any SA-men who had come to grief, smoked Party cigarettes, and very likely secretly joined the SA (Sturmabteilungen - Storm Troops) or the SS (Schutzstaffel - Protective Guard). Such a circle of enthusiastic but unfortunately unrestrained people had also been formed in Chi: they stood up for their idea, they also "fought" for it, but unfortunately they did not raise the question whether this fight was being carried on by proper means. Occasionally there was friction: with all due respect for the views of other people, I had to ask them not to take up a collection when on duty because that was forbidden; not to come to work wearing the Party emblem because that was forbidden; I was obliged to report it if one failed to come to work simply because he thought it more important to take part in a Jew raid. The reliability of some of these people decreased; they went to the casino [snack bar] more frequently than necessary, ostensibly to drink coffee but in reality to talk politics with one another in more agreeable surroundings. To such a circle the above-mentioned persons at Chi belonged with the exception of SCHIMPF, WAECHTER, PAETZEL, GLAESER, and SCHROEDER, who were much in sympathy with this circle but did not misuse their working time. Aside from political cares these people also had their private worries. SCHIMPF along with a very ironical tongue had an inferiority complex. He was suffering from the idea that he would not be able to fill successfully [illegible][10] REZNICEK, an

9. Alfred HUGENBERG was a member of the Reichstag from 1920-1933; chairman of the German National People's Party 1928-1933 and was Minister of National Economy, Food, and Agriculture in HITLER's cabinet, 1933. He retired in the same year and his party, the "Green Shirts" was dissolved by HITLER in 1933. [Editor's note].

10. OSCHMANN, see above p. 14.

extremely able cryptanalyst with an undeniable genius, was a radical and was personally discontented because I was Government Councillor (Regierungsrat) and he was not. So he was worried because he was not in line for a pension. SEIFERT was an officer on active duty, with an assured future, to be sure, but he had gotten the political bug and he thought that because of his wound he was regarded as physically unfit, so that he, as the son of an official (Beamter) was trying with all his might to become an official (Beamter). This striving was greater than his otherwise good sense and his recognized gifts and abilities. WAECHTER, despite all his skill as cryptanalyst, was primarily interested in becoming an official of relatively high grade (hoeherer Beamter) without having fulfilled even one of the requirements. PAETZEL was generally prudent but he shared with the others the concern about provision for his old age. WENZEL had no ideas of his own but he had unparalleled patience and could pursue a task with incredible persistence; he was an opportunist. SCHAPPER was at heart one of the most discontented: the idea of having to work all his life as an employee (Angestellter) in a more or less subordinate position made him especially impatient. BOETTGER, who had only mediocre ability but did have the best social form, had connections and knew how to keep silent about them until the moment came which brought him success. SCHROEDER was an idealist. Badly wounded in the World War, he suffered greatly because of Germany's impotence - and found his way into the Party. He made every sacrifice and gave all he had to help anybody who was in need.

In the eyes of the section REZNICEK was the leader of this circle. But behind the scenes SCHIMPF was working all the more intensively. It was said of him that as a precautionary measure he was secretly paying membership dues not only to the NSDAP but also to the Communist Party in Germany. He was ambitious! The inquiries of these male employees [redacted]MANN and me as to when they would be raised to the class of officials grew ever more urgent. None of them would comprehend that OSCHMANN and I not only had very little influence to push through such an appointment nor that the troubled times were especially unsuited for putting through reforms which would require the approval of at least two state ministers. The relations within the unit were becoming more acute while apparently SCHIMPF was attempting to make contact with GOERING.

30 January 1933 brought the "Victory of National Socialism". Personnel in government service were allowed to wear Party insignia, to enter the SA and SS, and everything that had been forbidden a few weeks before was now to be promoted in all possible ways. Then one day in the early spring of 1933 GOERING called up the Ministry of Defense to say that he wanted to talk with SCHIMPF. That was permitted - and about the middle of April 1933 SCHIMPF surprised the Cryptologic Bureau by saying he was going to take off his "Coat", i. e., his uniform, to become an official with Hermann GOERING. I heard later that GOERING had called SCHIMPF because someone had recommended him as an expert in the secret intelligence service. He, GOERING, knew that SCHLEICHER (Minister of War, but at that time still Chief of the Ministerialamt in Ministry of Defense) had only been so well informed at all times because he got his information from especially reliable sources. That was the great moment for SCHIMPF to reveal himself and to hold out in prospect to GOERING an organization which would supply no less valuable information. So GOERING pushed SCHIMPF; he resigned from the Navy and became Ministerial Governmental Councillor (Ministerialrat) in a few weeks. But even on the way to this success he remembered his friends and his "fellow fighters"; he planned nothing less than to take away from Chi, under the pressure of the already great authority of Hermann GOERING, the right to decrypt so-called diplomatic messages and to attract to himself the entire personnel, naturally without me and Dr. MUELLER. In his magnanimity he was not interested in Army cryptanalysis. However in the matter of personnel this was so intimately tied up with the so-called diplomatic cryptanalysis that neither the Inspector of Signal Troops (Inspekteur der Nachrichtentruppen) (FELGIEBEL) nor the Chief of Counterintelligence (Abwehrchef) could accept this demand. Now SCHIMPF brought up his heavy guns. He claimed his new office, the FA, was the only agency [illegible] political communications. However, the National Defense (Reichswehr) was not impressed, for HITLER could not under any circumstances take from the Foreign Office its right to diplomatic cryptanalysis, for he would have been circumscribing each of his department ministers in his sphere of activity; on the other hand, that same HITLER was considered a promoter of the Armed Forces, and

finally the diplomats of that era were in the habit of including military information in their reports so often that any trimming of the interests of the Branch, Foreign Armies (Attache Group) (Abteilung Fremde Heere (Attache gruppe) could not be tolerated officially, all the more so since neither the Foreign Office nor the FA would obligate itself to place at the disposition of the Armed Forces the messages decrypted in their cryptanalytic units. Now if the FA had actually been, as SCHIMPF maintained, the only authorized cryptanalytic agency, then Hermann GOERING could at least have put an end to the work of the Cryptologic Bureau by a stroke of the pen. Instead of that, the FA had to content itself with attracting from Chi those people who were ready to go voluntarily. And now all those people went voluntarily who had belonged to the same discontented group. They really had a bad conscience because the three former on active duty officers (SCHROEDER, REZNICEK, SCHAPPER) had been told often enough by me that it was not decent to quit at a time when one ought to be especially loyal to the Armed Forces. So these men and the others who were allowed to depart voluntarily without any attempt to lighten the burden of a bad conscience had to have something to sugar-coat their disloyalty. And for this they used the fairy tale of incompetence. Despite this incompetence the cryptanalysis of the messages of foreign governments not only remained in the hands of Chi, but the FA, which had demanded for itself the primary procurement of all cablegrams, was even forced to obligate itself to supply copies or duplicates of the encrypted messages to the incompetent Cryptologic Bureau of the Ministry of Defense. GOERING really should not have found it necessary to turn over such copies of telegrams to an incompetent agency. Thus the talk about the incompetence is proven to be a fairy tale. On the other hand, it may be true that HITLER in ignorance of the true circumstances did charge Hermann GOERING as the top figure in the FA with [redacted] those intelligence items which can be obtained by technical means but even then SCHIMPF - under the wing of Minister GOERING - had overshot the mark. For it was impossible to build up a single organization so that it would satisfy all the requirements of the Armed Forces and of the Foreign Office. And so even the procurement of Army radiograms remained in the hands of Chi; the Navy also

acted independently in the procurement of its material, and, looked at in a clear light the FA was nothing more than a new cryptanalytic unit of the Prussian Prime Minister who did not need any such service. A gigantic apparatus with supposedly far over 1,000 people was set up to provide Herr GOERING with those bits of information which had supposedly made von SCHLEICHER such a well oriented man. However, the fortunes of the people who went to the FA with SCHMPF were assured: SCHMPF very soon became Ministerial Government Councillor (Ministerialrat), but wound up his career even more quickly by suicide; the others soon became officials (Beamte). Shortly before the collapse, the former hopeless members of the Cryptologic Bureau, SCHAPPER, SEIFERT,[11] SCHROEDER became Ministerial Directors (Ministerialdirigenten) of the Air Ministry, hence no longer Prussian officials but officials of the Armed Forces with the rank of general. The call of the fatherland was the voice of a man with a fat purse. If we examine the fate of Hermann GOERING, we are justified in doubting whether he received from his "COMPETENT" Forschungcamt the information necessary for his well-being. This so competent gigantic organization really never did fulfill its true purpose. So it was merely an example of inflated vanity and the limitless intoxication of power. However, it would be naive, to say the least, if we were to excuse the beneficiary of such a want of character by saying that the Ministry of Defense had not been competent. If the FA as later organ of the Air Ministry had deciphered the messages of foreign air forces, then from an organizational standpoint everything would have been in order, but that is precisely what the FA did not do; can it be that it considered itself incompetent for the task? Old wives tales do not become truth merely by repeating them over and over again.

11. He quit as officer on active duty and "Hauptmann im Reichswehrministerium" to go to GOERING.

I. Concluding Remarks

No other German cryptanalytic units are known to me. It is conceivable that the Criminal Investigation Police (Kriminalpolizei) made attempts at cryptanalysis. As a rule, however, cryptograms (Kassiber) were sent to Chi. After the annexation of Austria, I was told that Andreas FIGL (cryptanalysis, Ballhausplatz) a retired Colonel and Government Councillor (Regierungsrat) turned up in Berlin and supposedly was active with the Criminal Investigation Police. FIGL did not pay a visit to his old comrades at Chi and I did not see him. In many circles he enjoyed a great reputation. Hence, it is possible that he was employed by the Criminal Investigation Police but I know nothing of interest.

12. FENNER states elsewhere that he was not aware that the Waffen-SS (Armed Protective Guard) made any attempt at cryptanalysis. According to him when the Forschungsamt was founded, its members constituted a special SS-formation. All members of the FA were members of the SS and were given promotions in it. [Editor's note].